INTRODUCTION
The common foundation for entailing liability in criminal law is that the defendant have got to be attested to have carried out a guilty action at the same time as possessing a guilty state of mind. The physical components are jointly labeled the actus reus and the supplementary mental condition is labeled as the mens rea. It is the basic responsibility of the prosecution to establish both of these components of the offence to the contentment of the judge or jury beyond reasonable doubt. Without such evidence the defendant will be exonerated.
Furthermore, the prosecution is required to establish that the defendant carried out the actus reus whilst in a particular mental condition. The mens rea essential prior to an individual could be condemned of a crime is indicated in the characterization of every crime. There are several states of mind which independently or jointly can make up the needed mens rea for a criminal offence. These include intention, recklessness and negligence. From time to time, the characterization of a criminal offence will make it apparent which of these mental conditions is suitable, however occasionally court judgments explicate the requirements of the description more specifically.
This paper intends to discuss the connection of mens rea and actus reus in a criminal offence. The discussions presented in this paper will be based on actual cases where these common law doctrines are provided.
ACTUS REUS
An actus reus is made of more than merely an action. It similarly takes account of whatever conditions and outcomes are acknowledged for legal responsibility for the crime under consideration. In other words, it consists of all the components of an offence except the mental component. Crimes can be separated into a couple of classes. Initially, there are conduct crimes where the actus reus is the illegal and illicit behavior itself. For instance, the actus reus of the offence of reckless driving is merely driving a mechanically driven motor vehicle on a street or other public place. No damage or outcome of that reckless driving is required be recognized. The second kind is deemed as result crimes where the actus reus of the crime needs evidence that the demeanor brought about an illegal and illicit consequence or end result. For instance, the actus reus of the offence of criminal damage is that possessions owned by another individual have to be ruined or damaged.
The actus reus have to be voluntary
The defendant’s conduct have to be voluntary or unreservedly resolved if he is to bring upon himself liability. It may possibly be involuntary for various causes. The following represents these causes.
Automatism
Automatism takes place where the defendant carries out a physical action but is oblivious of what he is carrying out, or is not on top of his acts, on account of several factor external of the defendant. (R v Quick [1973] 3 All ER 347)
Reflex Actions
Occasionally individuals can react to something with an impulsive reflex action over which they have no direct power. Even though, to some extent, different this is occasionally categorized as a kind of automatism. The characteristic case in point is that provided in Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER 193, of somebody being stung by a multitude of bees while driving an automobile, and being unable to control the vehicle.
Physical Force
The behavior may possibly be involuntary in that it is physically enforced by someone else, in which instance there will be an absence of actus reus. (Leicester v Pearson [1952] 2 All ER 71)
"State of Affairs" Cases
One collection of cases which cannot be argued in the context of voluntary actions is frequently denoted as the "state of affairs" suits. These offences are characterized not in the context of the defendant carrying out a constructive action however consisting in the defendant being found, being in control or being in control. In a number of such suits all the prosecution is required to establish are the subsistence of the factual conditions which make up the crime - the subsistence of the state of affairs. (R v Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74)
Omissions
There is an issue whether a person can be deemed criminally responsible for a failure to do something. The common rule is that there can be no legal responsibility for a failure to do something, except at the instance of the failure to act, the defendant was underneath a legal responsibility to seize constructive action unless a decree distinctively so grants, or the common law obliges a responsibility upon an individual to take action in a specific manner towards another, a measly oversight or omission to take action could not bring about criminal liability. (R v Miller [1983] 1 All ER 978.)
The dissimilarity involving positive actions and omissions was emphasized in the Bland case [1993] 1 All ER 821, where the House of Lords decidied that euthanasia through positive actions to terminate a patient's existence, like controlling a drug to cause his demise, is illegal. Nevertheless, retreating or ceasing medical treatment, as well as artificial nourishment, from an insensate patient with no expectation of recuperation when it was established that the outcome would be that the patient would in next to no time pass away, is legal if it was in the patient's welfare not to extend his/her life.
A positive duty to take action subsists such as responsibility being caused by statute. Legal responsibility for failure to take action will be forced where the defendant can be confirmed to have been under a statutory obligation to acquire positive action. (Greener v DPP (1996) The Times, Feb 15 1996) An additional is a duty based on a contract. Where an individual is under a positive responsibility to take action for the reason of his commitments under a contract, his failure to carry out the contractual responsibility under consideration can structure the foundation of criminal liability. (R v Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37) A third is public duty. An individual in a public office may possibly be under a public duty to look after others. (R v Dytham [1979] 3 All ER 641) Correspondingly, there is the voluntary supposition of responsibility or dependence. There is a common law duty of care where there is a connection of dependence involving defendant and victim. Therefore if someone willingly presumes accountability for another individual then they similarly presume the positive duty to take action act for the general wellbeing of that individual and may possibly be legally responsible for omissions which prove deadly. (R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] 2 All ER 341) And finally, there is the duty by reason of the defendant's previous behavior. If the defendant by chance consigns an action that brings about harm, and later becomes conscious of the hazard he has formed, there begins a responsibility to act rationally to forestall that hazard. (R v Miller [1983] 1 All ER 978)
Causation
When the characterization of an actus reus needs the incidence of specific outcomes, the prosecution have to establish that it was the defendant's behavior which triggered those outcomes to take place. There are a couple of kinds of causation. One is the causation in fact, in which the "But For" experiment is employed. (R v White [1910] 2 KB 124) Another is the causation in law, for which, for instance in homicide lawsuits, the defendant's actions have to be the working and considerable reason and grounds of fatality. (R v Smith [1959] 2 All ER 193)
MENS REA
Intention
Direct and Oblique Intent
In the context of law there are a couple of kinds of intention. Direct intent is the characteristic condition where the outcomes of an individual's actions are preferred. Oblique intent, also recognized as foresight intent, implies the condition where the outcome is anticipated by the defendant as practically certain, even though it is not preferred for its own sake, and the defendant carries on with his acts at any rate. (R v Moloney 1985)
To necessitating evidence that it was the defendant's intention to make happen a specific outcome may possibly entail placing an extremely serious evidential burden on the prosecution. Not unexpectedly, provided the above illustration, criminal law usually simply needs evidence of oblique intent (ie, foresight intent) in place of direct intent.
Intention Anchored on Foresight of Consequences
The courts have affirmed that foresight of outcomes can merely be proof of intention if the defendant is aware that those outcomes would undeniably come about. Therefore, it is not enough that the defendant simply anticipated a likelihood of a certain incidence. At one instance, DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, was authority for the perspective that an individual anticipated and anticipated the natural and likely outcomes of his actions. As a result, where foresight is needed to be recognized an individual is not to be deemed as meaning the natural and likely outcomes of his actions basically for the reason that they were natural and likely, even though a jury may possibly deduce that from observing all the facts. The test is consequently subjective and a jury is to come to a decision what the defendant's intention was from bearing in mind all the proof. The connection involving foresight and meaning was deemed by the House of Lords in Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55.
It is imperative to indicate that foresight of the outcomes is not identical as intention but merely proof of intention. (R v Scalley [1995] Crim LR 504) The justification of prescience of the outcomes in Hancock and Shankland and the Nedrick course, where suitable, are pertinent to all crimes and not only murder. A court or jury may similarly deduce that an outcome is anticipated, nonetheless it is not preferred, when the outcome is an almost positive result of the action, and the defendant is aware that it is a practically particular outcome.
Recklessness
Recklessness is the acquisition of an inexcusable risk. Nevertheless, two dissimilar tests have been created by the courts, the consequence of which is that recklessness now has a couple of unlike legal connotations which relate to dissimilar offences. The initial test for recklessness was subjective, ie the defendant is aware of the risk, is keen to deal with it and deals with it intentionally. The subject that has to be posed is whether the risk in the defendant's mind at the instance the offence was being carried out. This test was recognized in R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396.
The second test for recklessness is objective. Specifically, the risk has to be understandable to the reasonable individual, in that any reasonable individual would have acknowledged it if he had reflected about it. An individual is reckless in the new broader context when he carries out an act which generates an understandable risk, and, when carrying out the action, he has either granted no consideration to the likelihood of such a risk taking place or he acknowledged that a little risk subsisted, but carried on to put up with it. This test was recognized in MPC v Caldwell [1982] AC 341.
The risk has to be understandable to the sensibly prudent individual. It need not be understandable to the defendant. (Elliott v C [1983] 1 WLR 939) The individual who pauses to reflect will still be legally responsible if he acknowledged that there was some risk. (Chief Constable of Avon v Shimmen (1987) 84 Cr App R 7)
Negligence
Negligence consists of falling below the standard of the ordinary reasonable person. The test is objective, based on the hypothetical person, and involves the defendant either doing something the reasonable person would not do, or not doing something which the reasonable person would do. It does not matter that the defendant was unaware that something dangerous might happen, if the "reasonable person" would have realised the risk, and taken steps to avoid it. (McCrone v Riding [1938] 1 All ER 157)
Transferred Malice
Under the principle of transferred malice a defendant will be legally responsible for a crime if he has the essential mens rea and consigns the actus reus even though the injured party varies from the one anticipated. The foundation for this standard is the judgment of the court in R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359. If the defendant has the mens rea for a dissimilar crime from that which he consigns nonetheless, the intent cannot be conveyed. (R v Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119)
Coincidence of Actus Reus and Mens Rea
It is a common standard in criminal law that for an individual's liability to be recognized it has to be exposed that the defendant owned the required mens rea at the occasion the actus reus was consigned - thus the two have to correspond. This is similarly recognized as the contemporaneity rule. In a number of lawsuits a literal understanding of this rule would obviously bring about injustice, and the courts have carried out ways of establishing coincidence of actus reus and mens rea when the incidents happen over a period of time, and where they represent a course of events.
Continuing Acts
Where the actus reus entails an ongoing action a later mens rea throughout its persistence can coincide. (Fagan v MPC [1969] 1 QB 439)
Chain of Events
The second means in which the courts have addressed the issue is to take account of an ongoing sequence of actions to be an ongoing actus reus for the intentions of the criminal law. If the actus reus and the mens rea are both in attendance at some instance for the duration of this chain of events, then there is legal responsibility. (Thabo Meli v R [1954] 1 WLR 228)
0 comments:
Post a Comment