Research Korner: Effects on Young People

Changes in Korean Family Structure and the Conflicts of Ideology and Practice in Early Socialization

Changes in Korean Family Structure and the Conflicts of Ideology and Practice in Early Socialization Chung Byung-Ho Introduction With rapid industrialization and urbanization, the Korean family has undergone tremendous change in both structure and function. Family size is continuously decreasing, and the number of extended families is decreasing, too. One-generation and two-generation families have increased, and the increase in one-person households is remarkable. Divorce has increased explosively, and more than half of married women join the labor force. Family values and ideologies have not changed enough to meet with the changes in family structure. Modern values of an industrial society such as independence, freedom, and achievement have been gaining more and more importance in people’s lives, especially in the formal sectors such as schools, the workplace, and other formal organizations. Where the family is concerned, however, traditional values such as parental authority, children’s filial piety, and gender-role differentiation are still widely emphasized, and the virtues of the tradi- tional family are highly praised. Dominant values in today’s Korea still favor family care of infants and young children. However, during the last decade, Korea built an extensive day-care system in order to allow mothers to take employment outside the home. Under the surface of the monolithic image of Korean child rearing, which assumes the presence of a family and a “professional housewife,” in reality, there is a significant cleavage in the environments of early socialization between children reared at home and those in full-day child-care centers. Since the dominant discourses still emphasize the “modal” practice of child rearing and the role of the “proper” mother, the children in the centers and their working mothers are often considered either to be exceptions or an insignificant few who form a sort of cultural minority. Cleavages in the paths of early socialization often overlap with the divisions among social classes and differences in the conceptions of “proper” gender roles. Full-day child-care centers supposedly are for the children of working mothers who are either forced or willing to take outside occupations despite the dominant social norms. In this regard, the rapid expansion of the day-care system is not only a reflection of large scale economic changes but also a potential challenge to the official model for how Koreans are supposed to live. Traditional Ideologies and Current Problems Changes in Family Structure Over the last few centuries industrialization and urbanization have brought about changes in family structure all over the world. All these changes have occurred in modern Korea very drastically within the range of just a few decades. Table 1 shows these changes in some basic social indicators. The changes in family structure have occurred in accordance with the socioeconomic conditions. Table 2 presents the changes in household types. Table 2. Changes in Household Types (Unit: %) 1960 2000 One-generation 5.4 14.2 Two-generation 64.0 60.8 Three- and more generation 28.5 8.4 One-person 2.3 (1966) 15.5 Not blood related 2.1 1.1 Source: KNSO (2000b) As shown in Table 2, within a period of 40 years, extended families of three or more generations have decreased to less than one third, and one-generation families have almost tripled. The increase in oneperson households is even more remarkable. As the divorce rate has gone up from 2.5% in 1960 to 25% in 2000, single-parent families have also increased sharply. These statistics show the drastic changes in the Korean family structure over the last 40 years, and the trend will continue in the future for some time with the ongoing changes in the Korean society toward higher economic development, democratization, individualism, and longer life expectancy. Table 1. Korean Social Indicators 1960 2000 Per capita GNP ($) 79.6 9,628 Urbanization (%) 28.6 86.2 Life expectancy 52.6 74.9 Source: KNSO (2000a) Ideological Conflicts: “Normal” and “Abnormal” Family There is a cultural lag between practice and ideology. This situation produces psychological dissonance and creates adjustment problems of various kinds. The dissonance between the dominant traditional family values and widespread family practices can make people think that they are “abnormal” or even “immoral.” Ironically, the majority of family practices can be categorized as “abnormal” (Chung Byung- Ho 1995). The dissonance between the older and younger generations within a family is very serious, too. They have different ideas about whom to live with, what role to play, and how to interact and communicate. It is a source of heavy stress for both parties. The dissonance also exists within a single individual. Many people experience the conflict between their psychological need for freedom, independence, and equality, and the internalized cultural norms within oneself. This dissonance or inconsistency can lead to mental health problems, interpersonal conflict, and moral dilemmas (Chung Jean-Kyung 1996). These problems occur in any society to some extent, but they are more acute in Korea because of the rapidity of its industrialization. Korea’s tremendous economic development over the last three decades has attracted a lot of attention from all over the world. But economic blessings are not without a price. The changes in family structure occurred drastically without allowing enough time for adaptation or adjustment. Current Problems Traditional Korean family values are undergoing a change, but not fast enough to meet the changing family structure. In May of every year, which is designated the “family month,” the mass media laments the deterioration of the traditional family values, gives out prizes to those who kept the good tradition of filial piety (hyo), and prompts people to revive the good virtues. Clearly, one of the reasons Changes in Korean Family Structure and the Conflicts of Ideology and . . . 127 for the gap between family ideology and practice is that the high speed of changes in family structure did not allow people the time they needed to adjust their thinking. There are other reasons, however, that are more specific to Korean culture itself. Korea has been described as one of the most collectivist cultures (Bond 1988; Han and Ahn 1994; Hofstede 1980). People in collectivist cultures live in strong and cohesive in-groups and value ingroup solidarity, harmony, and duty. In-group norms are strictly followed, a practice which makes the members reluctant to stand out. Therefore, even when the pattern of family life has changed for many, they do not want to speak out for the new values in the face of the dominant majority. In a way, it is analogous to the concept of pluralistic ignorance, in that even though the new values are held privately by a lot of people, they tend not to surface and make changes in the cultural discourse unless the people realize that there are many others who feel like themselves. Another reason for the persistence of traditional family values can be found in Korea’s modern history. Since the nineteenth century, Korean society has experienced a dissolving of the traditional social stratification system, peasant uprisings, and a number of wars. With the Japanese occupation, many were deprived of their land, forced to leave the community, or drafted to the army and forced labor. During this period of turmoil, the people had to survive social insecurity, economic poverty, and cultural confusion, and the family was often the only resource and protection they had. Losing the protection of the government altogether, “family-centered survival” (Jo Hye-jeong 1988) became the life goal of most people. The external threats to the family elicited a strong reactive response. It enhanced the cohesiveness of the family as a unit, strengthened its ability to survive in the face of hardship, and consequently reinforced the sentiment of “familism” with all the traditional family values that go with it. 1) Obsessions of “Blood” and Extreme Infant Sex-ratio The most striking example is the phenomenon called “boy preference.” The sex-ratio of boys to girls at birth was 115.2:100 in Korea in 1994, the highest in the world (Newsweek 1995). The traditional value of continuing the patrilinear descendence with at least one son and the contemporary practice of having a small number of children found a solution in selective abortion, using the modern medical technology such as ultra-sonograms. The law prohibits selective abortion (in 1999, the sex-ratio lowered to 109.6:100), but the ratio tells how widely it has been practiced. For the fourth child, the ratio of girls to boys is less than 50 percent. A married woman is likely to be under some pressure from her husband and in-laws, either openly or covertly, to give birth to a son. The pressure from the husband’s family, however, is not the only factor. Often, it is the wish of the woman herself. This is where the problem gets more complicated. Women these days cannot and do not expect their sons to behave like the sons in the traditional family, obeying parents, living with them, and supporting them in their old age. They have observed that the number of elderly who live with and are supported by the oldest son, or any son, has decreased. Boy or girl, children these days have become an economic burden on the family rather than an economic asset or an insurance against old age. Furthermore, in modern nuclear families, the love and intimacy between husband and wife is not structurally interfered with. In this respect, the boy preference in contemporary Korea does not have the instrumental or sentimental basis it had in the past. The only meaningful aspect of the boy preference that is still effective is the symbolic power and status that bearing a son gives a woman in the husband’s family. The factors that comprise boy preference and influence a woman’s decision to have a selective abortion need further investigation. The immorality of the selective abortion is mitigated and rationalized with the excuse that it is done “for the family,” giving a good example of how the “familism” sometimes comes before morality. But, for many women who go through selective abortions, the psychologi cal hurt remains. Even when it is their own decision, the guilt and pain from “killing a baby girl, a daughter that might have been,” troubles them for a long time. It goes against their basic moral values, and creates a dissonance that does not go away easily (Chung Jean-Kyung 1996) 2) Private Competition and Erosion of Early Childhood Under circumstances in which the family unit becomes smaller and the value of domestic labor drops, the social realization of self for the married women becomes even more imperative, not only as a personal goal but also as a social necessity. However, patriarchical family ideology blocks any paths open to married women for self-realization in the social or official spheres.1 Frustrated married women are often susceptible to many pathological problems, and they, as an oppressed cultural minority, may cause numerous social problems, especially in relation to education and childcare. Children’s education becomes one important arena where women compete with a concentration of their personal ability and social resources. Being restricted from many socially meaningful activities, mothers seldom find ways to fulfill their social self other than realizing it indirectly through their children. On the other hand, it is considered to be one of the most acceptable and surest investments, one that is closely related to traditional strategies for establishing one’s place within the existing social stratification. As such, it is a serious social power game, with the future at stake, in which mothers become major players. In view of a familism based exclusively on blood ties, children cannot be separated from the family, and thus, they are expected to function as a means of reproduction of family, status, and property. As the number of children in the nuclear family decreases, the traditional expectation becomes an intolerable pressure on the children. It often leads to collective child abuse, as a kind of new cultural practice, to which the contemporary Korean society at large has yet to be sensitized. Compared to the past, today’s younger children in Korea are blessed with material abundance. However, they are deprived of spontaneous social relationships and cultural experiences. They are typically confined to the apartment of the nuclear family, especially with their mothers who are usually isolated from relatives, neighbors, and larger communities in their daily interactions. Limited spaces in institutional group settings for education and care do provide experiences to interact with others. However, these invaluable opportunities are often eroded by collective class-room activities which promote competitive early learning and talent training. Due to their parents’ ambition and strong desire to see their children achieve much at an early age, many young children find themselves spending long, passive hours every day in talent-training classes. Field (1992) describes a similar phenomenon caused by parental obsession in Japan, and argues that it is an example of forced “labor” upon children. For the children, it results in the “erosion of childhood” (Suransky 1982), taking away the experiences and happiness they deserve during their childhood. 3) Working Mothers and the Need for Socialized Childcare Unlike our image of Korean mothers as “professional housewives” who rear their children and stay at home, a significant number of mothers are fully incorporated into paid work outside the home, and a large percentage of children are reared in institutional settings. In the year 2000, 77.9% of married women worked, while 27.3% of mothers with 0-5 year-old children (33.9% with 3-5 year-olds; 20.5% with 0-2 year-olds) had jobs, numbers that run counter to the dominant values which still insist that the mother should care for infants and younger children in the home. Further, three out of four full-time housewives, ages between 25-29 years old, want to have jobs outside the home, if they can find a proper arrangement for the care of their children (Hankyoreh 21 2001). In other words, today’s Korean mothers favor more socialized childcare than family care. The problem is that the society is not able to recognize nor to respond to their demands properly yet. Figure 1 shows the dynamic changes of the women’s participation in the labor force during the years from 1960 to 1995. The participation rate has more than doubled since the 1960s. The rapid expansion of the Korean economy and the ever increasing demands for labor have been considered as the main causes of this radical change. But, it also needs to be examined from the supply side, from the changes in women’s lives. Marital status, child birth, and education are the major factors that affect the women’s participation to the labor market. All of these areas have changed drastically. First of all, the total birth rate dropped from 4.8 children in 1965 to 1.7 in 1985, and it has remained at this level to the present (KWDI 1997). It means that women have been somewhat freed from the demands of repeated pregnancy and child birth during their marriages. It also affects families’ investment into girls’ education. Second, the average number of years of formal education for women increased from 3 years in 1960 to 9.3 years in 1995. The increase in the education of younger women had been so rapid that, by 1995, there was no difference in average length of education between men and women under 30 years old (Jang 1998). During the initial period of industrialization, in the 1960s and 1970s, undereducated young girls as unskilled cheap laborers in the factory had been the symbol of women in the labor force. Now, more and more women with higher education want to find jobs with the potential for a life-time career. Third, the average age for a woman’s initial marriage gradually increased from 21.5 years old in 1960 to 26 in 1995 (ibid., 1998). Prolonged education must have affected the delay of initial marriage. At the same time, many young women see marriage as a less appealing option that would disrupt their individual social lives, and would rather extend unmarried life with a career as long as possible. Even after marriage, they tend to delay childbirth. The sharp valley in the M-curve of the women’s age-cohort labor pattern (Figure 1) reveals the reality of the labor market. It represents both how the labor market pushes women out at the time of mar- riage, childbirth, and child rearing, and how the society is not supportive of them. Dominant ideologies concerning the family and the role of the mother lay the cultural foundations for these discriminatory social practices against women. The establishment of the socialized child-care system will be an effective tool for further social change. Dual Responses: “Education” and “Care” Families, homes, and mothers are still considered to be major agents for the early socialization of children in Korea. However, rapid industrialization and urbanization have created emergent new needs for early socialization outside the home. The speed of change has been so fast that the society has failed to respond to them in time. The traditional view of education as a means of social competition has eroded the childhood experience by being extended to younger children. The lack of understanding of the need for social childcare has made the children of some working mothers the victims of fire when they were locked in tiny one-room apartments. Still, Korean society has difficulty in acknowledging the contemporary problems of childcare and education as social responsibilities. Children under the ages for compulsory education are believed to be in the hands of mothers, and thus, the expenses of their education and care are considered to be solely family matters. Even the advocates and policymakers, who argue for the governmental support for early socialization, find their rationale in the traditional perspectives on competitive schooling and the welfare of the poor. Early Education: Domestic and International Competition Kindergarten education in Korea started out as an exotic form of early socialization for the children of elite families. As an import for the privileged, it displayed many distinctively foreign cultural forms that became the dominant mode of early education. Not only the material settings such as buildings, classes, and educational materi- als, but also the songs, dances, and ways of speech and interaction patterns were modeled after the dominant foreign practices. During the colonial period, the prewar Japanese kindergarten practices laid the foundations of the kindergarten culture in Korea. Uniforms, collective activities, and ritualized interactions between teachers and children are still visible in many kindergartens as a legacy of the past. After the liberation and the Korean war, American culture added a new layer to the kindergarten life. Some kindergartens, usually affiliated to universities, started to emphasize more liberal approaches for individual freedom and development. However, their influence has been limited to a few experimental institutions because of the societal obsession for the competitive education. Still, popular perception of early education as fundamentally foreign and advanced has been confirmed and widespread. Even today, many early educational institutions display the names of foreign scholars, theories, and practices as their models. Until 1975, kindergarten enrollment of the 5 year-old children had remained under 2.8%. It rose to 45% in 1997.3 This marks a significant shift from the education of the few to that of the masses. However, the modes of education have not changed much. Kindergartens in contemporary Korea are mainly for the children of nonworking mothers. With only morning-hour programs (four hours a day as a standard, usually with a 9:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. daily schedule) and with long vacations, kindergartens assume the existence of full-time housewife mothers. A very limited number of kindergartens in urban areas have started to provide after-hour services for the children of working mothers, but few of them are willing to extend their programs into the long vacations. In short, they are schools and they have all the characteristic rhythms of formal educational institutions. There has been an even more explosive expansion in the field of early education parallel to the kindergarten. This has been the expansion of the private institutions for early talent training. It is sometimes called the “early education industry,” since most of these institutions clearly show a profit-motivation by running institutions with business-like management skills. In these institutions, children from very early ages are supposed to learn any specific subjects such as reading and writing, math, foreign languages, drawing, dance, swimming, and taegwondo. Every possible subject in education is for sale. In this field, discourses on the success and the failure in education are consumed extensively among educators and both working and nonworking mothers. Competition is the key factor that makes mothers most deeply afraid. Earlier learning is widely believed to be the only effective tool for success in the realms of domestic and international competition. It is no wonder that many advocates and policymakers emphasize international competition as a reason for further governmental investment in early education. Child-care Priority: Class or Gender The government’s delayed response to childcare was not simply due to inefficient bureaucratic arrangements, but was mainly due to dissonance in the cultural concepts (or political ideologies), especially among the policymakers, concerning the roles of the government and the family. In 1981, the First Lady of the President who had come to the power through the military coup launched an ambitious campaign, called the “New Village Kindergarten” (saemaeul yuawon), for early childhood education. She transformed all of the full-day child-care institutions (hundreds of children’s homes or eorini jip) into half-day kindergartens for the early education for the poor. This project systematically up-rooted the child-care system while Korean society was well into its rapid industrialization. The ideas behind full-day childcare were often thought to be “communistic.” At the same time, the practice of institutional childcare was legally blocked until the democratization of 1987. However, even today, this period is highly praised in the history of education as one of drastic development from the “simple care” to the “advanced early education.” Any systematic response to the child-care needs had been delayed in Korea until there occurred a series of accidents in which infants and toddlers who had been locked inside the house were killed in fires while their parents were out working. Such accidents occurred repeatedly in the years between 1989 and 1991 and were considered to be clear evidence of policy failures in which the necessity of state-supported childcare had been consistently ignored. It was at that time that the general public finally realized that society and the government should assume responsibility of childcare since many individual nuclear families were no longer able to provide the necessary care themselves. Finally, the Infant and Childcare Law was passed in 1991. Immediately, the child-care system rapidly expanded to such an extent that in 1997 the total number of institutions became 15,375 (public, 1,158; private, 8,172; workplace, 158; family, 5,877), enough to care for 520,859 children (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998). These were neither the natural fruits of economic development nor the mechanical outcomes of policymaking by state bureaucracies. Childcare advocates and some progressive women’s organizations had to struggle for the establishment of today’s day-care system. Various forms of struggle such as rallies, sit-ins, fund raisers, signature collections, law petitions, and political campaigns had to be carried out to make even a minimal child-care system available. At the same time, the labor market demands on working mothers also pressed conservatives to make a bargain with progressives over the expansion of day care. Suffering from an extreme labor shortage beginning in the late 1980s, the Korean economy began to rely on imported foreign labor. As a means of exploiting available domestic labor, the day-care system was implemented for the integration of young mothers into the labor force.4 This was when the Ministry of Labor decided to step into the day-care business. However, there were limits to how far the system could expand and in what directions. The system itself ran counter to the dominant family values. The notion that financial support for childcare is only for the underprivileged class (or “broken” families) was firmly set in policy from the beginning. The government and conservatives held the view that most “ordinary” (or middle-class) families should carry the financial burden since the primary role of day care is child rearing. It is fundamentally a welfare program for the poor families in which mothers are forced to work outside home. The government only supports the public centers, which are supposedly located in underprivileged communities, and it provides subsidies for the children of families who receive social welfare. All private and family care centers operate only on the tuition.5 As private businesses, it is natural that most of these centers seek profit. However, childcare is fundamentally less profitable than education because of regulations prescribing “proper” teacher-children ratios for the care of younger children for the full day. The contradictions between policy and practice are the source of current problems which result in a lack of infant and toddler care in most centers. Many centers even demand the softening of regulations in order to have the kindergarten-like large classes but with fewer teachers. Unlike the stereotypical images of childcare as a form of social welfare for the poor, the actual need of childcare has been emerging across classes and regions. After such rapid social change, it is now almost evenly distributed among the entire population, as a significant proportion of women of all ages and classes participate in (or, at least, want to participate in) work outside the home. The only difference is whether this need is visible to the society or it is obfuscated by the sacrifices of individual family members. The need itself is not homogeneous any more. It is diverse and depends on the types of work and the life cycles of mothers. Further, as the divorce rate increases, not only the types of families but also the life-style choices of families also increase, and thus diversify the needs of childcare. The recently established Ministry of Gender Equality views childcare as mainly a gender issue rather than a class one. It seeks the establishment of a more comprehensive child-care system that would greatly enhance women’s participation to, and status in, the society. On the other hand, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which still has full control over the system, insists on extending the system to support the poor and the working class. Debate in Practice From 1996, the kindergarten advocates have proposed to make the education for all 5-year-old children as part of the national compulsory schooling. By comparing Korea’s percentage of preschool enrollment with those of other OECD countries, the advocates have persuaded the government, and the proposal was accepted. It means that the establishment of half-day preschool education has now become the top national priority for early socialization. It also proposes the establishment of a nationally standardized education system for children over three years and a national care system for the infants and toddlers under age three. The advocates for “care” have resisted these proposals. They view them as a uniform application of educational policy to address radically different demands in early socialization. Further, they argue for the urgent extension of the child-care system to school-age children. The issue of the “unification of kindergarten and the day-care system” has been a central theme of the debate among the people in both camps, and in the related offices of government. In terms of theory and principle, it is rather a clear and simple demand, since both institutions serve overlapping age groups (from three to five, that is, preschoolers), and everyone agrees that for these children, education and care should not be separated. But, it is often speculated that conflicts of interest in the two camps and between the related government offices act as major obstacles to the unification. The two parties never come to terms with one another, since the kindergartens want to see a “kindergartenization” of the day-care centers, and, on the other hand, the day-care centers prefer a process of expanding the “full-day” care function to the kindergartens. However, the current situation can also be viewed as a reflection of social and cultural divisions at a deeper level. There are many layers of larger divisions in society that would directly influence the division of the two systems—such as divided concepts of mothering, radically different views on childhood, and different ideas about early socialization in institutional settings. Furthermore, there are fundamental policy differences regarding these institutions among three government offices: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Gender Equality. Each system is supposed to respond to one set of needs and expectations of a different segment of the population. Sometimes, the arbitrary division of the system dictates the choice of the people who are less dichotomized than the governmental definitions. The division itself guarantees a dichotomized experience for the children. How far can this division between “education” and “care” go? Is the current situation a process of polarization of early socialization, or a process of eventual integration of the two systems and concepts? The answers remain, in large part, dependent on changes in the larger society: changes in the nature of women’s participation in social labor, changes in the mother’s role in the domestic sphere, and changes in society’s view of educational institutions and education itself. However, there are groups of people who believe in the power of social action to make and accelerate changes through their efforts, especially in the day-care field. In order to challenge the dominant cultural patterns and social structure in Korea, some individuals and organizations, with progressive ideologies of class and gender issues, utilize day care as transformative institution for socializing a new generation—children who will acquire alternative values and behaviors—and for inducing concomitant sociopolitical change. While the majority of kindergartens and day-care centers in contemporary Korea still effectively carry out conservative functions by practicing the collectivist and discipline-oriented process of socialization, some centers, such as the “cooperative childcare” (gongdong yuga) centers, challenge them by developing a radically permissive pedagogy that emphasizes activities in nature and at a tempo of daily life rather than a tightly organized school-like schedule in the classroom (Chung Byung-Ho 1994). Through daily interaction, these experimental centers perform mediating functions by developing strong bonds between child-care practitioners and parents, and among the parents. Based on this social bond and these consciousness-raising efforts, the adults are politicized through their involvement in institutional child-care practices, and become organized to participate in various communitylevel social movements and engage with important concurrent social issues. They have opened the day-care field as a new arena where the dominant concepts and patterns of early socialization are constantly challenged and transformed. In this context, theory and practice in the Cooperative Centers have become an excercise of “cultural politics” (Giroux 1991) intervening in power structures. Conclusion Research on early socialization in Korea has mainly focused on childhood experiences in the home and familial relationships. The strong ties between mother and child have been considered crucial in formulating the later personalities, interpersonal relationships, and adult social participation. Such conceptions of universal experience in early socialization are mostly based on conceptions of Korea in which a homogeneous national culture, patriarchal family structure, and rigid gender-role division are supposed to dictate social life. However, like families in any society that has undergone rapid industrialization, Korean families have also gone through all the characteristic changes attendant to the processes of industrialization and urbanization. The current problems emerge mainly from the rapidity of these changes. The speed of these societal changes has created serious dissonance between the traditional family ideology and the already diversified modes of family lives. Working mothers and the issues of socialized childcare constitute one of the most dynamic fields in which the contradictions of contemporary Korea can be seen. The dominant ideologies still dictate that mothers stay in the home, but, in reality, the majority of mothers work outside the home. The hegemonic exercise of cultural perceptions such as “full-time housewife and mother” pushes women to leave the labor market during the childbirth and child rearing only to return to it later and receive much lower wages and positions. According to the dominant values, children under age five should be reared in the home by family members, but, in practice, institutional modes of collective child rearing are rapidly becoming popular among many families across different classes and regions. As in other industrial societies, Korea, too, developed its childcare system initially to put mothers into the labor force (Chung Byung-Ho 1992b). But, during the last decade, the focus of the system has gradually shifted from the mothers to the socialization of the children. What children learn or experience in a child-care facility has become a greater concern, since it touches on a variety of issues: equality (or equal opportunity) between children at home (or in a half-day kindergarten) and children in a full-day child-care center; the nature of the center, whether as a place for early schooling or for communal living; and the role of the center, whether as a socializer of dominant values or of alternative ideals. Socialized childcare itself has been considered to be a fundamentally subversive practice to the traditional family ideology. Now, like the heated debate of “education” and “care” for children of the same age group, the questions of who controls, what kind of program, for whom, and for what are more explicitly confronted and debated in many fields of early socialization by groups with varied and often contradicting expectations for future generations. REFERENCES Bond, Michael Harris. 1988. “Finding Universal Dimensions of Individual Variation in Multicultural Studies of Values: The Rokeach and Chinese Value Surveys.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55: 1009- Choe, Jae-seok. 1983. Hanguk gajok jedosa yeon-gu (The History of the Korean Family). Seoul: Iljisa Publishing House. Chung, Byung-Ho (Jeong, Byeong-ho). 1992a. “Childcare Politics: Life and Power in Japanese Day Care Centers.” Ph. 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Changes in Korean Family Structure and the Conflicts of Ideology and Practice in Early Socialization Chung Byung-Ho Introduction Wi...

Causes of Poverty among People with Disability in Malawi

Causes of Poverty among People with Disability in Malawi                 Eradicating poverty is one of the main problems every country is facing   particularly the third world nations. Various aids from the developed countries   have been already given but it has only proven one thing: there is no panacea for   poverty. What’s necessary step in fighting poverty is to determine first the causes   of destitute life particularly those people with disability.               In Malawi, deeply rooted poverty is the major obstacle in its growth and   development. The country largely depends on foreign aid in salvaging its weak   economy and massive food shortages. Emergency aid helps to feed poor   Malawians, but what the country needs are long-term poverty reduction   measures for the absolute future development.               Poverty often means hunger. About 70 percent of Malawians or 8 million   people live below the national poverty line. And more than 90 percent of them   live in rural areas that largely depend on subsistence farming. In 2006, the   country emerged from consecutive years of drought and chronic food security   having an unusually large maize harvest seeking to meet the immediate needs of   most Malawians. But, the good news is a delusion for rural areas that were   affected by dry spells and floods during the growing season. Limited or failed   harvests make poor rural citizens unable to feed their hungry stomach.               The spread of HIV/AIDS also had an impact in worsening the condition of   poverty in Malawi. One millions Malawians are infected with HIV/AIDS causing   90,000 deaths in 2003 and leaving about 400,000 children orphaned. Due to   these circumstances, young people who often lack the skills and experience are   forced to shoulder the burdens in making a living for their family.               Moreover, gender inequality exacerbates the living conditions among poor   people. Women are always in the subordinate position in the society limiting their   access to education and inputs of production. Thus, the opportunities in   liberalizing the agricultural production are only available for male farmers   weakening the labor force.               On the other hand, disabled people in Malawi have a different plight in   poor life. It is a common knowledge that people with disabilities in the Southern   African region particularly in Malawi are experiencing difficulties in carrying out   daily activities and integrating to the society in full participation. Physical barriers   in the form of inadequate and insufficient accessibility in local services such as   schools and workplaces form discrimination and negative attitudes among the   society at large.               Although disability is a relative term encompassing restriction of ability to   perform normal human functions, its measurement is beset with problems   including the poor standardized reliability and validity of data regarding people   with disabilities.     Disabled people have lower income levels than the rest of population due   to incomplete education. School attendance among persons with disabilities is   clearly lower having 35 percent of them never attended school, in compared to   18 percent to the non-disabled people. High illiteracy rate among disabled people   decreases their opportunities in lucrative jobs in the country.   On one hand, there is a high prevalence of disability caused by   communicable disease and perinatal injuries than the childhood disabilities in   underdeveloped countries than in the developed nations. Disability in first world   countries stems in preventable impairments that could be eliminated through   treatment or rehabilitation. This implies that massive hunger causes malnutrition   that takes a large effect on health dwarfing the physical and intellectual   development of a child.               All citizens of a country could contribute to the growth and development of   the nation as a whole. People with disability should be treated fairly and should   be given programs aiding them to be productive as non-disabled people.   Moreover, helping disabled people to be productive as they should get is not only   about giving back to their mother country, it is more about self-fulfillment that they   could reach personal goals and could be whatever they want to be.     References:   Kadzandira, John et. al,  Consultations with the Poor, July 1999   Elwan, Ann, Poverty and Disability, December 1999   Living Conditions among People with Activity Limitations in Malawi, September 2004

Causes of Poverty among People with Disability in Malawi

Causes of Poverty among People with Disability in Malawi Eradicating poverty is one of the main problems every country...