Contemporary liberalism, which reduces all to individualistic self-expression and moral license, must be countered by another liberalism that can draw on the founding sources of the liberal tradition itself. An intellectually persuasive and socially effective countering, of course, must draw also on the religious sources that, however unrecognized, give coherence to the tradition's treatment of virtue and human flourishing. Countering the currently prevalent notions of liberalism is today typically called conservatism.
However, liberalism in itself has been evolving to be more tolerant of religion and its doctrines. Using a descriptive type of research and an organizational analysis on five groups: political science professors from (1) Lehman College, (2) Mercy College, and (3) Fordham University, (4) undergraduate students from these colleges in the Bronx, and (5) clergy from the Bronx), this study shall prove that liberals now does not necessarily feel hostile on religion but rather they shall exhibit more tolerance.
The Decline of Liberalist Hostility on Religion
IntroductionIn the twentieth century, religious and political liberalism have generally been congruent, as were religious and political conservatism, along the dimension of universalism and particularism (Collins, 1993). The rhetorical contrast "liberal/conservative" ties the concepts to the mobilization of conflict irrespective of its content. The familiar congruence of liberalism and conservatism in religion and politics is historically specific; it emerged at the exhaustion of the religious wars in the late seventeenth century, and developed along with secularization into the early twentieth century (Collins, 1993).
From the religious standpoint, the standard treatment of liberalism and religion tells us that liberalism saved religion from itself--that is, liberalism saved religion from its bloodcurdling excesses and absolutist demands (Elhstain, 1999). It is said that by forcing a regime of "toleration" on religion, liberalism in its constitutional forms demanded that religion act more humanely. And so it came to pass that both sides--"sectarian" groups (meaning religious groups) and non-sectarian groups (all the others organized along the lines of the liberal mandate)--have learned to live happily or at least safely with one another. But this truce is insistently represented as fragile. If religion threatens to get "out of hand"--that is, if believers threaten to take their religion seriously--it must be beaten back.
In the various formulations of liberal political theory developed in recent decades, the concept of the person has played a critical and controversial role, both as an idealized model of rational agents who choose principles of justice and as the profile of actual citizens whose interests are to be promoted and protected. In a wide away of liberal theories, it is assumed that the person so conceived be able to reflect rationally on her desires, character, values, and commitments, and revise them in light of such reflection (Christman, 2001). That is, the paradigmatic "self" of liberal theory is an autonomous agent. This has placed the concept of autonomy, then, at the center of these controversies, since for a variety of liberal views, the fundamental value to be assumed and protected in a just society is the autonomy of the person, in particular this capacity to rationally reflect and revise aspects of the self that form one's identity and commitments (Kymlica, 1989, 1995; Waldron, 1993).
The chorus of criticism that has arisen during this period has focused on the problematic individualism implicit in the conception of the autonomous person operative in liberal principles. Charges have been made about the narrowness and parochial nature of the liberal conception of the (autonomous) self, both when it is used as an idealization for deriving basic principles and as a model for specifying the rights and interests of actual citizens. Communitarian critiques of the unencumbered self are typical, but equally forceful are claims made by feminists, postmodern thinkers, and various defenders of identity politics to the effect that the theoretical use of the idea of the self-revising rational person is both exclusionary and, at its worst, oppressive (Sandel, 1998; Young, 1990).
The concept of the autonomous person functions in numerous ways in various self-described liberal views currently being defended: in some views, autonomy is assumed to hold for persons in the derivation of liberal principles, as a projected characteristic of the abstract entities whose reflections and choices figure in the derivation of substantive principles of justice; Rawls's reference to rationally autonomous choosers behind the veil of ignorance is an example of this (Rawls, 1993). Second, autonomy figures in the specification of the actual citizens to whom principles of justice are meant to apply, citizens whose interests and capabilities are represented in those principles (Rawls, 1982). Moreover, the capacities associated with autonomous agency serve to delineate the population of citizens deserving full moral respect and rights of full political participation. Finally, autonomy is sometimes postulated as an ideal--a personality type or set of capacities that liberal social policy should be shaped to promote (Wall, 1998). In all cases, however, the view of autonomy being presupposed or promoted includes the capacity to rationally scrutinize one's attachments, values, indeed all aspects of one's identity, from a perspective detached from each of those aspects themselves.
Liberalism assumes that despite the fact that value orientations, commitments, and cultural identity often arise from factors outside the agent's control, all are nevertheless subject to reflective revision. But it is clear that even if some specific values and beliefs might be open to reflective consideration, many other aspects of our identity and selfhood that fundamentally orient and shape those values and beliefs are not.
Liberalism is generally understood to be a political theory that places the individual at the center and sees each individual as a free and equal person. Recognition of every individual's uniqueness and humanity lies at the core of liberalism, which sees all persons as deserving of mutual respect, civil and political liberties, and decent life chances (Gutman, 1994). Liberalism promotes tolerance and protects freedom of conscience, religion, speech, and assembly. While many liberal theorists believe personal autonomy is the fundamental tenet of liberalism, other liberal theorists regard tolerance as liberalism's fundamental principle (Stopler, 2003). Notwithstanding the egalitarian basis of liberalism, critical legal scholars, post-colonial theorists, and feminists have all criticized liberalism as exclusionary and as maintaining the hegemony of dominant groups.
Much of the public debate in religion is framed in terms of the combat between two polarized groups: those religious conservatives who prefers policies, laws and guidelines based on the religious doctrine; and those liberals who would argue for the freedom of choice. Battles in this culture war are fought regularly in courtrooms, direct-mail campaigns, local school board elections, and national politics. Journalistic dispatches from the front typically frame the conflict in its most dramatic and polarized terms.
More often, the assumption is that religion must be defined in terms of God. But, of course, what counts as God (Nirvana, Brahman, the Tao, the Transcendent) differs considerably from religion to religion. Indeed, some religions the oldest forms of Buddhism, for example make no claims about any god, and much religion places rather more emphasis on tradition, community, and how people live, than on belief in God.
Tillich argued that the object of faith is what concerns us ultimately (1957, pp. 1 29). Historically, the great religions have nurtured and shaped people’s ultimate concerns and commitments but, he argued, people can and sometimes do direct their faith their religious commitments toward what is not truly ultimate but idolatrous. Similarly, social scientists have often discussed functional religions those comprehensive ideologies and symbol systems that (although they need not involve God) define ultimate reality in ways that give meaning and direction to people s lives: nationalism, communism, psychoanalysis, humanism, even, perhaps, science (or scientism). Like traditional religions, they too can define people’s ultimate hopes, values, and convictions and be grounded in a faith to which all else is subordinated.
Liberals believed that religion could be progressive as theologians used modern scholarship to rethink and reform their own traditions. So, for example, the liberal theologians who shaped the mainline Protestant denominations and Reform Judaism came rather quickly to accept evolution and historical criticism of the Bible. Many conservatives, in response, reasserted their belief in the inerrancy of Scripture and the authority of tradition, and their opposition to evolution. In his very influential book Culture Wars (1991), James Davison Hunter argued that battles of this third culture war are most prominent in contemporary America. On most moral, political, and educational questions a wide measure of agreement links liberal Jews, Catholics, and Protestants on the one hand as it does their conservative counterparts on the other. These distinctions can be overdrawn; there is an evangelical Left, for example, and some religious liberals are political and moral conservatives. Still, the culture war between conservatives and liberals has submerged denominational differences to a striking extent.
Purpose of the Study
This proposed study seeks to illustrate the level of hostility among liberals on religion by using survey questionnaires and interviews on five organizational groups. This shall also clarify the debate on whether liberals feels extremely hostile on religion or have reached the level of tolerance. This is particularly important in lieu with the changing nature of liberalism. It shall prove the contention that liberalism has evolved to be a more tolerant movement towards religion.
Hypothesis
This proposed study shall test the following hypothesis:
The more liberal a person is politically the more likely they are to have negative attitudes toward religion
Methodology
This section will discuss the method of research to be used, the respondents of the study, the sampling technique, the instrument to be used, the validation of the instrument, the administration of the of the instrument and the statistical treatment of the data that will be gathered.
Research Design
This study will use the descriptive approach. This descriptive type of research will utilize interview, observation and questionnaires in the study. To illustrate the descriptive type of research, the researcher will be guided by Creswell (1993) when he stated that the descriptive method of research is to gather information about the present existing condition. Moreover, the purpose of employing this method is to describe the nature of a situation as it exists at the time of the study and to explore the cause/s of a particular phenomena.
This study will determine the views and opinions of liberals such as political science professors from Lehman College, Mercy College, and Fordham University, undergraduate students from these colleges in the Bronx, and clergy from the Bronx. The unit of analysis will be based on an organizational level. This was selected since it shall be a representation of the organizations included in the study. Moreover, in this way, it is easier to generalize than if the unit of analysis is on the individual level. On the other hand, it will not be as extensive as an analysis on the macro-level. Samples from these institutions will be purposively selected as the respondents of this study. Survey questionnaires and interviews shall be conducted in order to illustrate their level of hostility or empathy on religion. This will be determined by using measurements and comparison of views on religious and political issues such as abortion, euthanasia, divorce, pre-marital sex and contraception. These will serve as the instruments in determining their attitudes towards religion.
The primary source of data will come from a researcher-made survey questionnaire which will be given to the respondents. The respondents of this study will be purposively selected political science professors from Lehman College, Mercy College, and Fordham University, undergraduate students from these colleges in the Bronx, and clergy from the Bronx.
The secondary sources of data will come from published articles from religion and philosophy journals, theses and related studies on liberalism and its subsequent effects on the empathy of liberals on religion.
For this research design, the researcher will gather data, collate published studies from different local and foreign universities and articles from social science journals, distribute sampling questionnaires; arrange interviews; and make a content analysis of the collected documentary and verbal material. Afterwards, the researcher will summarize all the information, make a conclusion based on the null hypotheses posited and provide insightful recommendations on the issue of religion and liberalism.
Respondents of the Study The general population for this study will be composed of purposively selected political science professors from Lehman College, Mercy College, and Fordham University, undergraduate students from these colleges in the Bronx, and clergy from the Bronx numbering to sixty (60).Sampling Techniques
The researcher will use a combination of cluster and random sampling. First, the researcher will cluster the five identified groups: political science professors from (1) Lehman College, (2) Mercy College, and (3) Fordham University, (4) undergraduate students from these colleges in the Bronx, and (5) clergy from the Bronx). From each cluster, the researcher will select the liberals that will be included in the study.
Validation of the Instrument
For validation purposes, the researcher will initially submit a survey questionnaire and after approval, the survey will be given to 10 prospective respondents, two from each organization. After the survey questionnaire will be answered, the researcher will ask the respondents for any suggestions or any necessary corrections to ensure further improvement and validity of the instrument. The researcher will again examine the content of the survey questionnaire to find out the reliability of the instrument. The researchers will exclude irrelevant questions and will change words that would be deemed difficult by the respondents, to much simpler terms.
Administration of the Instrument
The revised instrument will then be administered to the respondents of the study which will be chosen through a combination of cluster and random sampling. The researcher will exclude the ten respondents who will be initially used for the validation of the instrument. The researcher will also tally, score and tabulate all the relevant data in the survey questionnaire.
Scope and Limitations
This proposed study seeks to determine the level of hostility of the respondents who are considered as liberals on religion. Several ethical considerations needs to be outlined: (1) the identity of the respondents may not be disclosed if he/she wishes to; (2) some answers in the interview may be requested as confidential; and (3) the researcher shall have the responsibility on any material or answer that is given by the respondents. In order to address these limitations, I shall be drafting a letter signifying the intention of the respondents to publicly exhibit their answers or not. Moreover, the confidentiality clause shall be put in the questionnaire and signed by both parties.
Significance of the Study
This proposed study seeks to serve as a means of weighing the opinions of liberals on religion. Arguably, there are several forms of liberals and that they have evolved over the years. Based on this study, one can discern the changes on the level of hostility on religion of liberals. Moreover, it can contribute on the literature on the conservative/liberal debate by providing points of clarification.
Conclusion
Liberalism has often conveyed an antagonistic attitude towards religion. However, researches shows that there has been an evolution on liberalism. Moreover, the contention is that liberalism works on the basic tenet of the self- thus, hostility may not be necessarily connected to liberalism though there are points of divergence. Thus, liberalism may be more tolerant on religion than it was years ago. This proposed study seeks to determine if the change is already achieved. This will also clarify some points on the liberal/religious debate.
References
Christman, J. (2001) Liberalism, Autonomy and Self-Transformation. Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 27.
Collins, R. (1993) Liberals and Conservatives, Religious and Political: a Conjuncture of Modern History. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 54.
Davison, J. (1991) Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books.
Elhstain, JB. (March 1999) The bright line: liberalism & religion. New Criterion, Vol. 17.
Gutmann, A. (1994) Introduction in Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 3, 9.
Kymlica, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rawls, J. (1982) Social Unity and Primary Goods. In A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159-85.
Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 30 f.
Sandel, M. (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stopler, G. (2003) Countenancing the oppression of women: how liberals tolerate religious and cultural practices that discriminate against women. Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, Vol. 12.
Tillich, P., Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, SCM, London, 1953.
Waldron, J. (1993). Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wall, S. (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, IM. (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
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