Philosophical discussion. in ancient and modern times, has tended to deal separately with language, perception (including knowledge based on perception) and voluntary action, and at different periods the focus of attention in each of these fields has tended to be significantly different. The pattern followed in this chapter is to treat first the philosophical concern with language, and then philosophical discussion of perception (and knowledge derived from perception) and voluntary action. Conventionally, one can distinguish between: 1. the philosophy of language 2.linguistic philosophy (in the sense of various uses of linguistic methods in investigating philosophical questions 3. the philosophical aspects of modern linguistics 4. the unavoidable dependence (regardless of any theories about language) of philosophy on language as the medium for philosophic exposition and debate 5. the specialised use of language as a philosophical device in modern logic and the construction of formal languages ( rather different in approach from what is described above as linguistic philosophy).
The most recent turn in the relation between language and philosophy has come partly from Austin's development of ordinary language philosophy into a view of language as action, partly from a new interest in the problem of meaning and partly from the change of direction in linguistics (Chomsky's ideas on the 'deep structure' of language and the innateness of grammar). Austin's views on language as action precede but fit well with views developed in linguistics of the functional basis of language. Whilst the categories of action which a sentence performs were at different times analysed in somewhat different ways by Austin, his key point was that "the basic unit of study is not the word or the sentence but the act which a person performs with the aid of words or sentences; the theory of language is to become, as it were, a branch of the theory of action... the total act performed by the speaker with the aid of the sentence".
In philosophy, theories of perception have normally been derived directly from epistemology, from theories of knowledge. Epistemology has for centuries been a central interest of philosophers; the means by which knowledge is acquired, the extent of our knowledge and of our possible knowledge, and the criteria for judging reliability, truth or falsity. In examining knowledge, philosophers traditionally have been divided into two camps, the rationalists and the empiricists. The rationalists' view is that the only reliable source of knowledge is human reason; mathematics is the paradigm example of reliable knowledge arrived at purely by reason; all sense experience can be delusory and is therefore not a reliable source of knowledge; true knowledge is the result of the inherent properties of the human understanding (or, in the case or Plato and some other philosophers, of our gradually coming to grasp the true ideas with which we are innately provided). Much of the discussion has been in terms of what it means to say that we 'know' something; there has been much rather fruitless argument about the extent to which to say one 'knows' something must mean that the thing known is objectively so, that knowledge is a guarantee of certainty, a confusion between the subjective and objective aspects of 'knowledge'.
Significance of language for philosophy
Language is validated by perception and action, not the other way round. Language is not 'the sole and essential point of contact for the philosopher with reality' - and the most pressing contacts with reality impose themselves without any intermediation of language. Language is not, on the view in this book, an abstract rational structure but one built on the most mundane of foundations, in human neurophysiological structure; it is subsidiary rather than primary in human behaviour and thought.
Meaning as a central topic in the philosophy of language
The discussion about 'meaning' is a peculiarly apt demonstration of the self-reflexive property of language. If, it might be said, philosophers cannot agree to tell us what 'meaning' means, how can they give us reliable guidance on the meaning of any other philosophical concepts? The philosophical discussion of meaning has demonstrated perhaps more clearly than any other segment of philosophical activity both the difficulty and the confusion of the philosophical enterprise.Thus, a meaning is what makes a difference to the neurophysiological organisation of the individual acquiring the meaning or expressing the meaning. The process of determining the 'meaning' of a sentence is, operationally, the use of semantic and syntactic clues, derived from the serial string of words, to determine the particular meaning and role of the word, in that sentence on that occasion.
Perception as the foundation of knowledge of the real world
Attempts to develop a separate philosophical treatment of perception in terms of sense-data have not been convincing or provided a way out of the dilemma; naive realism and pragmatism react simply by disregarding the philosophical arguments of idealism and scepticism which they cannot refute. The practical common-sense philosopher, like Ryle, opines that theory about perception in philosophy can proceed perfectly well without any reference to the investigation of perception as a physiological or psychological process.
The integration: of perception, action and language, resulting in the underlying isomorphism of all languages, combined with the true knowledge of the external world which the evolution of the cognitive and visual apparatus has made possible, opens the way to a new pursuit of philosophical truth through language. The intellectual development of mankind can proceed, as it is doing, but on a philosophically more secure basis and in the knowledge that language, as a flexible instrument designed to match the open-endedness of human experience (perception and action), can be a reliable medium for exploring, recording and developing man's knowledge of the external world and of his own nature.
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